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THE DUE PROCESS CONUNDRUM: USING 
MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE AS A STANDARD 
FOR PRIVATE HOSPITALS UNDER THE 
HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
AMY L. MOORE* 
I. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
Medical malpractice litigation had exploded in the United States by 
the mid-1980s.1  This increase in malpractice suits was partially caused by a 
shift in public opinion—what once was an unconditional trust of doctors 
shifted to a more searching inquiry into the motivations and behaviors of 
health care professionals.2  As the number of cases increased over time, so 
too did the amounts awarded by juries in terms of damages, averaging in 
excess of $100,000, and often exceeding $1 million.3  Patients who had 
been wronged by their physicians also became more willing to file suit 
because of these increased jury awards.  These jury awards were often 
crippling to private hospitals, which in turn would take responsive or 
sometimes preemptive action against these suits by terminating their 
                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University college of Law. Special thanks 
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 1. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“Medical malpractice 
poses a serious threat to America’s health care system. . . . The malpractice crisis has 
escalated throughout this past decade.”); Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir. 
1993) (“The early 1980s witnessed a new trend in health care litigation as states and health 
care accrediting bodies stepped up their promotion of peer review . . . . As this process 
gathered force, physicians aggrieved by the results of peer review increasingly appeared in 
federal court . . . .”). 
 2. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5540 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 
37 (1986) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector 
General, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.); 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986); Subcomm. 
Hearings at 135 (statement of Dr. William Mixon, former president, American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists) (“The ACOG acknowledges that there is a problem of a 
lack of public confidence in the mechanisms employed to protect the public from poor 
practitioners.”); Medical Practice: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t of the H. Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) (statement of 
Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t) (“Both doctors and 
their patients complain that their relationship is increasingly adversarial.”). 
 3. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore). 
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relationship with the offending physician.4  However, contemporaneous 
studies showed that for every 242 times a patient was killed or injured as a 
result of doctor negligence, only one serious internal disciplinary action 
was taken against the doctor.5  Thus even as external action in the form of 
litigation was increasing, internal action was stagnant or nonexistent as 
hospitals seemed to refuse to punish doctors for incompetent behavior. 
During this time period only a few hospitals began to take proactive 
steps to stem the tide of litigation, revoking a doctor’s privileges to practice 
at a hospital if the doctor was incompetent or unprofessional.6  The process 
used by hospitals to revoke a physician’s privileges usually included a peer 
review process comprised of other doctors from the same hospital.7  
However, the doctor whose privileges had been revoked could in turn sue 
the hospital for numerous state law violations such as breach of contract or 
defamation.8  This backlash litigation against the hospital meant that peer 
review and removal of offending doctors did not protect it from litigation as 
the hospital had initially theorized that it would.9 
Aside from strategic use of litigation, some doctors under 
investigation by state boards would voluntarily surrender their licenses in 
one state before a formal hearing could take place so that they could 
continue to practice medicine in a different state where they maintained a 
license.10  This tactic would become part of a plea bargain where hospital 
boards could avoid costly due process hearings and physicians could 
continue to practice medicine.11  In essence, the hospital would agree to 
take no action against the physician if he or she would simply leave town 
and practice incompetent medicine somewhere else.  Sometimes these deals 
                                                 
 4. Id. (“Meanwhile the skyrocketing cost of malpractice insurance has led many 
doctors to quit the business, and made health care more expensive for everybody.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“One [problem] is 
that hospitals too often accept “voluntary” resignations of incompetent doctors in return for 
the hospital’s silence about the reasons for the resignations.  Hospitals make these 
agreements in order to avoid lengthy and unpredictable litigation. The other is that there is 
no comprehensive national reporting system to follow bad doctors from place to place.”). 
 5. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 54 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, 
Public Citizen Health Research Group). 
 6. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 2 (“Unfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards, 
hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or unprofessional 
doctors often do not do so.  Even when such bodies do act against bad physicians, these 
physicians find it easy to move to different hospitals or states and continue their practices in 
these new locations.”). 
 7. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (statement of David H. Weinstein et al.). 
 8. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“[D]octors and health 
care personnel will never be able to police their own ranks until Federal laws are changed to 
protect peer review. Under current law, a doctor who testifies against a colleague can be 
sued for slander or restraint of trade.”). 
 9. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 50 (testimony of Hon. Thomas J. Tauke). 
 10. Id. at 34 (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs.). 
 11. Id. 
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would even include carrying good references from the hospital in exchange 
for leaving town and not suing the hospital.12  The threat of being sued thus 
had an obvious chilling effect on the reporting of incompetence.13  Even in 
cases where payments were made to patients, part of the settlement 
agreement would sometimes include a promise not to report the information 
about the doctor to the state licensing board.14 
Other doctors are considered the “first line of defense” against 
malpractice because they observe it happening around them.15  However, 
reporting or whistleblowing about another doctor’s incompetence, without 
any protection, can discourage doctors from coming forward with these 
claims to even start the peer review process.16  This meant that some 
hospitals simply did not engage sufficiently in peer review.17 
A. The History of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
In order to protect hospitals that did engage in peer review from 
any backlash litigation from unhappy physicians, state legislatures had 
begun to pass provisions to provide legal immunity for these hospitals.18  
                                                 
 12. Id. at 48 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t). 
 13. Id. at 44 (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs.). 
 14. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 55 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, 
Public Citizen Health Research Group) (“Based on data from the American Medical 
Association, we have estimated that in 1984 patients were awarded damages 16,400 times in 
medical malpractice cases, usually by out-of-court settlements.  In a large proportion of 
cases, part of the settlement agreement involves a promise not to report the information 
about the doctor to the State Licensing Board.”). 
 15. Id. at 52 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden). 
 16. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“In the long run, 
doctors themselves are in the best position to put an end to malpractice.  As some of the 
most highly trained individuals in our society, physicians are ideally qualified to hold their 
profession to the highest standard.  But doctors and other health care personnel will never be 
able to police their own ranks until Federal laws are changed to protect peer review.”); 
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 66 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public 
Citizen Health Research Group) (“Every physician I know in the country who is practicing 
medicine tells me that there are one or more physicians at his or her hospital who are 
incompetent and when I say why are they still there, they say we are afraid to bring an action 
against them because they will retaliate and so forth.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“Doctors who are sufficiently fearful of the 
threat of litigation will simply not do meaningful peer review.”). 
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986) (“Unfortunately, groups such as state 
licensing boards, hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or 
unprofessional doctors often do not do so.”). 
 18. See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—
Is It Time For A Change?, 25 AM. J. L & MED. 7, 59 (1999).  Congressional legislative 
history also shows that this was a federal problem. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 131 
(statement of Dr. William Mixon, former president, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists) (“The immunity granted in the bill would overcome . . . shortcomings in 
state law and the absence of protection for peer review in federal law.”). 
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While a majority of states already had legislation to protect both 
professional review and dismissal of physicians by the time Congress 
passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, the terminated physicians 
could work around these state immunity laws by filing actions in federal 
court.19  Usually the federal claims were grounded in federal antitrust law. 
An example of this type of litigation, and something that Congress noted as 
“a primary impetus for . . . immunity” in the form of the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act,20 was the case of Patrick v. Burget.21 
Dr. Patrick had worked for the Astoria Clinic and Columbia 
Memorial Hospital in Astoria, Oregon as a general and vascular surgeon.22  
He was invited by the partners of the Astoria Clinic to join them as a 
partner, but he declined and instead opened up his own, independent clinic 
that competed with the Astoria Clinic.23  As a result, the doctors at the 
Astoria Clinic cut ties with Dr. Patrick and refused to give him referrals.24  
Ultimately, they initiated a peer review process at Columbia Memorial 
Hospital and Dr. Patrick resigned before the hospital could revoke his 
privileges.25  He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon claiming violations of the Sherman Act because the peer review 
had been conducted in order to reduce competition as opposed to improve 
patient care.26  The jury returned an award of $650,000 on the antitrust 
claims.27  As required by law, the District Court trebled the damages.28 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
peer review proceedings were immune from antitrust scrutiny under the 
state-action exemption from antitrust liability.29  As explained by the Ninth 
Circuit, “[t]he doctrine exempts from the antitrust laws actions by the state 
such as passage of laws by the legislature or promulgation of rules by the 
state Supreme Court acting in its legislative capacity.”30  If the action is not 
directly undertaken by the state legislature or the state Supreme Court, it 
must be “taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
state policy and must be subject to active supervision by the state.”31  In this 
                                                 
 19. Scheutzow, supra note 18, at 58. 
 20. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights) (Note that Edwards refers to this 
case as Patrick v. Astoria Clinic in the legislative history.). 
 21. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
 22. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 95–96. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 97. 
 26. Id. at 97–98. 
 27. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 98. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 
466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984)). 
 31. Id. (citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 
(1985)). 
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case, because Oregon required licensing of its health care facilities and also 
required that procedures existed for granting or restricting privileges of 
medical staff employed by those facilities, Oregon was compelling 
physicians to review their competitors and had “affirmatively . . . expressed 
a policy to replace pure competition with some regulation.”32 
The Supreme Court ultimately held, reversing the Ninth Circuit, 
that the state-action exemption did not immunize the hospital and federal 
antitrust law would apply.33  The Court found that Oregon did not satisfy 
the active supervision part of the required test and thus did not “exercise 
ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct.”34  None of 
the state actors mentioned by the Ninth Circuit or argued by the 
respondents, “[had] succeeded in showing that any of these actors 
reviews—or even could review—private decisions regarding hospital 
privileges to determine whether such decisions comport with state 
regulatory policy and to correct abuses.”35 
However, the Court noted that it was responsive to policy 
arguments articulated in amici briefs that “effective peer review is essential 
to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat of antitrust 
liability [would] prevent physicians from participating openly and actively 
in peer-review proceedings.”36  The Court responded that this argument was 
essentially about whether antitrust law should be applied in the area of 
medical care, a question properly addressed to the legislative branch.37  This 
question had already been answered, in part, with the passage of the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act.38  Thus, the Court would not erect a barrier 
to federal court for physicians wishing to use antitrust law against hospitals. 
The Supreme Court would also later interpret the jurisdictional 
requirement of the Sherman Act broadly, allowing even more cases to be 
brought into federal court against hospitals under federal antitrust law.39  
The Court recognized a federal cause of action by a physician who had lost 
medical privileges (or been denied those privileges) against the hospital or 
peer review committee if the physician alleged that the decision of that 
hospital or committee violated the Sherman Act.40  In the case of Summit 
Health v. Pinhas, the Court concluded that even though a hospital’s main 
                                                 
 32. Id. at 1505–06. 
 33. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105. 
 34. Id. at 101 (“The active supervision prong of the . . . test requires that state officials 
have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and 
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.  Absent such a program of supervision, 
there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state 
policy, rather than merely the party’s individual interests.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 105 n.8. 
 39. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–33 (1991). 
 40. Id. at 332–33. 
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activity was providing health care services to a local market, it also engaged 
in interstate commerce.41  Therefore to initiate an action under antitrust law, 
there was no requirement of a manifest intent to actually restrain interstate 
commerce but rather any attempt to prevent the hospital from expanding 
would be covered by the Sherman Act.42  Merely the purchase of out-of-
state medicines and supplies as well as revenues from out-of-state insurance 
companies would establish the appropriate interstate nexus.43  Thus, a 
conspiracy on the part of the hospital (or a peer review panel) to terminate a 
doctor’s privileges at a hospital would frustrate interstate commerce in the 
giving of medical services and potentially violate the Sherman Act.44  
Congress accordingly had the power to regulate the peer review process.45  
This power to regulate extended also to reporting on the results of peer 
review as “reports concerning peer review proceedings are routinely 
distributed across state lines and affect doctors’ employment opportunities 
throughout the Nation.”46  Therefore, overall there could be “no doubt 
concerning the power of Congress to regulate [the] peer review process.”47 
Congress had intervened amidst antitrust litigation and medical 
malpractice suits and passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 
“[t]o encourage good faith professional review activities of health care 
entities, to require collection and dissemination to hospitals and other health 
care providers of information concerning certain payments in medical 
malpractice claims and certain adverse decisions, and for other purposes.”48  
Congress was worried about “the chilling effect which treble damages in an 
antitrust claim can have on effective peer review,”49 and these federal 
damage awards and claims were, of course, outside of the reach of state-
based immunity laws.  However, the immunity provided in the federal 
statute was much broader than any individual state law in that it insulated 
health care entities not only from antitrust lawsuits, but extended to “any 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 329. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Id. at 330 (“A violation [of the Sherman Act] may still be found . . . liability 
may be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.” 
(quoting McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980))). 
 45. Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 332–33 (“We have no doubt concerning the power of 
Congress to regulate a peer review process controlling access to the market for 
ophthalmological surgery in Los Angeles.  Thus, respondent’s claim that members of the 
peer review committee conspired with others to abuse that process and thereby deny 
respondent access to the market for ophthalmological services provided by general hospitals 
in Los Angeles has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal 
jurisdiction.”). 
 46. Id. at 327–28. 
 47. Id. at 332. 
 48. Heath Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, H.R. 5540, 99th Cong. (as reported 
by the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Sept. 17, 1986). 
 49. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights). 
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law of the United States or of any State.”50  In reviewing the bill before its 
passage, the task of the Committee on the Judiciary was partially to 
“consider the implications of such a broad immunity, and to explore the 
balance between encouraging peer review on the one hand and preserving 
important rights and remedies on the other.”51 
The Committee on Energy and Commerce reported “the purpose of 
this legislation is to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging 
physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent 
or who engage in unprofessional behavior.”52  However, “it [was] the 
Committee’s intent that physicians receive fair and unbiased review to 
protect their reputations and medical practices.”53  Part of this protection for 
physicians included the “due process and other standards provided in the 
bill.”54 
As described by the Eleventh Circuit in interpreting the statute: 
Congress enacted the HCQIA to address the rising problem 
of medical malpractice and the ability of incompetent 
doctors to move between states without having their prior 
practice records follow them . . .  We conclude that the 
intent of . . . the federal . . . statute [], therefore, is “to 
facilitate the frank exchange of information among 
professionals conducting peer review inquiries without the 
fear of reprisals in civil lawsuits.”55 
This balancing of interests is important.  As noted by Richard Kusserow, 
the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services at 
the time HCQIA was passed, public perception about the adequacy of 
hospital board discipline had shifted.56  The public had become increasingly 
frustrated with boards not protecting patients but was also dissatisfied with 
the time it took to conduct a proper hearing.57  He remarked, “the public 
perceives that bad doctors should not be practicing medicine, but we must 
give these doctors due process. Not everyone understands this.”58 
                                                 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2013). 
 51. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards). 
 52. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385. 
 53. Id. at 11. 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 330 F. App’x 775, 779 (11th Cir. 
2009) (quoting Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 
1994)). 
 56. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 37. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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B. Structure of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
HCQIA provides immunity from monetary damages to a hospital 
and the individual members of a peer review committee for the termination 
or suspension of a physician’s privileges if those actions comport with the 
proper statutory requirements.59  The statute also mandates a reporting 
system, implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services into a 
national registry and data bank. “Under the national reporting system, 
insurance companies are required to report medical malpractice 
payments . . . ; boards of medical examiners are required to report sanctions 
imposed against physicians . . . ; and health care entities are required to 
report adverse professional review information.”60  Hospitals are also under 
a duty to request information from the Secretary in order to grant privileges 
to a physician or licensed health care professional.61  Once privileges are 
granted, hospitals must renew their request every two years and update that 
information.62 
The Data Bank created by the Secretary under authority from the 
statute thus prevents a physician who applies for privileges at a hospital 
from being able to conceal disciplinary actions that have been taken against 
him or her.63  The Data Bank information reports not only the hospital’s 
findings but also the physician’s response.64  However, the hiring hospital is 
under no obligation to turn away a physician due to the information 
supplied by the previous hospital or the Data Bank.  As the Eleventh Circuit 
explained: 
What the requesting hospital does with the information it 
obtains from the Data Bank is entirely up to that hospital.  
It could completely discount the information, or it could 
back off from any professional relationship with the 
physician, or it could make further inquiries to determine 
what had actually happened.65 
If a hospital or health care entity does not participate in the national 
reporting system, the Secretary may publish the entity’s name in the Federal 
                                                 
 59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111(a), 11112(a) (2013). 
 60. Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1028 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing 
§§ 11131–11133 (2013)). 
 61. § 11137(a). 
 62. Id. § 11135(a). 
 63. See, e.g., Leal v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 620 F.3d 1280, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 64. Id. at 1284. 
 65. Id. 
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Register.66  If an entity’s name is published, it may not receive the 
immunity provided by the statute for a three-year period.67 
However, in order to receive immunity initially, the statute requires 
a professional review action to be taken in accordance with certain 
requirements found in § 11112(a): 
a professional review action must be taken— 
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the 
furtherance of quality health care, 
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, 
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are 
afforded to the physician involved or after such other 
procedures as are fair to the physician under the 
circumstances, and 
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by 
the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts 
and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).68 
It is clear from the legislative history surrounding the creation of these 
factors that they were established to ensure that physicians being reviewed 
by private hospitals were provided something akin to adequate due 
process.69  Congress patently provided for due process in §§ 11112(b) and 
11112(c), expanding on the nature of the “adequate notice and hearing 
procedures” required in § 11112(a)(3). 
                                                 
 66. Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1028 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 67. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11111(b) (2013)). 
 68. § 11112. The statute was amended in § 11111 to clarify that all of the standards 
must be met in order to receive immunity. See § 11111; 132 CONG. REC. 30,766 (1986). 
 69. See, e.g., Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden) 
(“[W]e have given physicians under review full due process rights with notice and 
representation.”) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of 
medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are 
incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior. . . . [P]eer review will be 
protected . . . provided the peer review actions meet the due process and other standards 
provided in the bill.”) (emphasis added); 132 CONG. REC. 30,767 (1986) (“These provisions 
are now referred to in the amendment as “notice and hearing requirements.”  The substantive 
provisions remain unchanged.  This change in terminology is intended to preclude the 
implication that the bill defines “due process” for any purpose beyond the purview of the 
bill.”). 
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Section 11112(b) provides a list of “safe harbor” provisions, which 
if met by the hospital or peer review committee, can be used to satisfy 
§ 11112(a)(3).70  These safe harbor provisions provide: 
[§ 11112](b): Adequate notice and hearing[:] A health care 
entity is deemed to have met the adequate notice and 
hearing requirement of subsection (a)(3) of this section 
with respect to a physician if the following conditions are 
met (or are waived voluntarily by the physician): 
(1) Notice of proposed action[,] The physician has been 
given notice stating— 
(A)(i) that a professional review action has been 
proposed to be taken against the physician, 
(ii) reasons for the proposed action, 
(B)(i) that the physician has the right to request a 
hearing on the proposed action, 
(ii) any time limit (of not less than 30 days) within 
which to request such a hearing, and 
(C) a summary of the rights in the hearing under 
paragraph (3). 
(2) Notice of hearing[,] If a hearing is requested on a timely 
basis under paragraph (1)(B), the physician involved must 
be given notice stating— 
(A) the place, time, and date, of the hearing, which 
date shall not be less than 30 days after the date of 
the notice, and 
(B) a list of the witnesses (if any) expected to 
testify at the hearing on behalf of the professional 
review body. 
(3) Conduct of hearing and notice[,] If a hearing is 
requested on a timely basis under paragraph (1)(B)— 
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), the hearing shall 
be held (as determined by the health care entity)— 
                                                 
 70. § 11112(b). 
2015] THE DUE PROCESS CONUNDRUM 11 
(i) before an arbitrator mutually acceptable 
to the physician and the health care entity, 
(ii) before a hearing officer who is 
appointed by the entity and who is not in 
direct economic competition with the 
physician involved, or 
(iii) before a panel of individuals who are 
appointed by the entity and are not in 
direct economic competition with the 
physician involved; 
(B) the right to the hearing may be forfeited if the 
physician fails, without good cause, to appear; 
(C) in the hearing the physician involved has the 
right— 
(i) to representation by an attorney or other 
person of the physician’s choice, 
(ii) to have a record made of the 
proceedings, copies of which may be 
obtained by the physician upon payment of 
any reasonable charges associated with the 
preparation thereof, 
(iii) to call, examine, and cross-examine 
witnesses, 
(iv) to present evidence determined to be 
relevant by the hearing officer, regardless 
of its admissibility in a court of law, and 
(v) to submit a written statement at the 
close of the hearing; and 
(D) upon completion of the hearing, the physician 
involved has the right— 
(i) to receive the written recommendation 
of the arbitrator, officer, or panel, 
including a statement of the basis for the 
recommendations, and 
12 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2: 1 
(ii) to receive a written decision of the 
health care entity, including a statement of 
the basis for the decision.71 
Clearly this is a robust list of provisions intended to give hospitals and other 
health care entities an idea of what an “adequate notice and hearing” in this 
context ought to contain.72  The Committee on Energy and Commerce 
explains, “[t]he due process requirement can always be met by the 
procedures specified in [§ 11112 ](b). . . . If other procedures are followed, 
but are not precisely of the character spelled out in [§ 11112](b), the test of 
‘adequacy’ may still be met under other prevailing law.”73  The Committee 
does not specify what kind of test will apply to adequacy in these other 
cases.74  However the Committee notes that some courts have requirements 
for review activities and actions that might require fewer or different due 
process rights than the one specified in the statute and that these 
requirements should be taken into account for a proper analysis of whether 
a hearing is adequate under the statute.75 
Importantly, the language ending this subsection states that: “[a] 
professional review body’s failure to meet the conditions described in this 
subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of 
subsection (a)(3) of this section.”76  Therefore, if the safe harbor provisions 
of the statute are not met, that does not mean that the hearing is inadequate 
under the statute.  The safe harbor provisions are mere guidelines, not 
requirements.  There is consequently a gap between what the statute 
                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. However, there were even some concerns in the legislative history that the lengthy 
due process provisions contained in the listed portion of the statute were insufficient. See, 
e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 30,770 (1986) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights) (“In a host of ways, the due process procedures set forth 
in the bill, fail to provide adequate safeguards to health care providers improperly before 
peer review committees.  Notice is inadequate; there appear to be no mechanisms for 
compelling testimony or for providing the physician, in advance, with the evidence 
supporting the peer review action; and, in the end, the ‘due process’ provisions of the bill are 
merely advisory, not obligatory.”); Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 81–82 (statement of 
Victor M. Glasberg) (“If the Federal Government is going to—if it is going to permit some 
kind of immunity arising out of adherence to due process, that there should be a requirement 
of full and reasonable notice, and I submit that vague and nonspecific reasons for the 
proposed actions won’t make it.  Doctors are going to get letters saying, ‘We have a problem 
with these charts. . . .’ [T]he hospital will load it on.  They will have culled the record, they 
will have gone through everything, and the doctor in question will be made to respond to a 
whole raft of allegations, within a period of time very short normally one or two weeks. . . . I 
submit that there should [also] be a provision for access to records and copying of records, 
as required for the fair defense of the case.”). 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt.1, at 10 (1986). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 10–11. Again, there is no illumination about what kind of tests these are or 
what other tests for adequacy might contain. 
 76. § 11112(b) (emphasis added). 
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requires under these provisions and what kind of process a peer review 
committee needs to provide to meet the floor of adequacy.77  However, the 
statute itself gives no particular insight into what satisfies for adequate 
notice and hearing outside of the safe harbor requirements. 
The third point under this section in the statute, § 11112(c), 
provides certain conditions under which adequate notice and hearing 
process may be suspended or satisfied due to several emergency situations: 
[§ 11112](c) Adequate procedures in investigations or 
health emergencies[:] For purposes of section 111111(a) of 
this title, nothing in this section shall be construed as-- 
(1) requiring the procedures referred to in 
subsection (a)(3) of this section— 
(A) where there is no adverse professional 
review action taken, or 
(B) in the case of a suspension or 
restriction of clinical privileges, for a 
period of not longer than 14 days, during 
which an investigation is being conducted 
to determine the need for a professional 
review action; or 
(2) precluding an immediate suspension or 
restriction of clinical privileges, subject to 
subsequent notice and hearing or other adequate 
procedures, where the failure to take such an action 
may result in an imminent danger to the health of 
any individual.78 
Thus if no professional review action is taken, as defined elsewhere in the 
statute, or there is a relatively short time period or danger involved in taking 
the time for more process, then the bar for adequacy of process may be 
moved lower.79  The Committee on Energy and Commerce also notes that 
“due process can be different in health emergencies . . . .”80 
                                                 
 77. This statement seems to undermine the entire section. Subcomm. Hearings, supra 
note 2, at 80 (statement of Victor M. Glasberg) (“The immunity is predicated on the due 
process being provided and then at the end of the provision they say, oh, by the way, with 
regard to that due process, if you didn’t provide it, it doesn’t matter.  That is not right.”). 
 78. § 11112(c). 
 79. Id. 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 6. 
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II. CIRCUIT COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE HEALTH CARE 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
Since the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act in 
1986, circuit-level courts have interpreted it or considered its provisions 
only seventy-two times.81  Only twenty-six of these cases dealt specifically 
with § 11112(a)(3) of HCQIA, which invokes the requirement that the peer 
review action at issue provide adequate notice and hearing procedures.82  If 
it is so imperative that doctors be protected during the peer review process, 
even as the occurrence and reporting of that process is being incentivized, 
then why is there not more litigation on this issue in the more than twenty-
five years since the statute has been in existence?  Courts have skirted the 
application of § 11112(a)(3) through finding a lack of an independent cause 
of action in the statute, waiver of the part of physicians, or the use of 
summary judgment to solve the problem as a pure legal question where the 
presumption lands against the physician. 
A. Presentation of Statutory Due Process Argument before Circuit 
Courts 
Initially, an obstacle to analyzing due process requirements under 
the statute stems from the fact that HCQIA itself provides no independent 
cause of action for a physician against a hospital.83  There is nothing in the 
text of the statute itself to support a cause of action where a physician could 
sue a hospital for lack of due process in this area, but the Supreme Court 
has said in some cases statutory causes of action may be implied.84  In order 
to determine whether an implied cause of action exists, four factors must be 
considered: 
 
First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial 
benefit the statute was enacted,’ that is, does the statute 
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?  Second, is 
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?  
                                                 
 81. This number was derived from performing a Westlaw search for “HCQIA” in the 
federal circuit courts.  Those cases were then reviewed for relevance and are available in list 
format in a chart on file with the author [hereinafter “Chart”]. 
 82. Chart, supra note 81. 
 83. Three separate circuit courts have ruled specifically on this issue. Wayne v. 
Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 1998); Bok v. Mut. Assurance, Inc., 119 
F.3d 927, 928 (11th Cir. 1997); Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kan., 21 F.3d 373, 
374–75 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 84. Bok, 119 F.3d at 928 (“When legislation does not provide expressly for a cause of 
action for individual plaintiffs, the legislation must provide an implied cause of action in 
order for individual plaintiffs to be able to sue under the legislation.” (citing Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975))). 
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Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?  
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally 
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of 
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause 
of action based solely on federal law?85 
 
The lower courts that have analyzed the issue of an implied cause of action 
in HCQIA have uniformly rejected an implied cause of action in the 
statute.86  Instead, these courts have concluded that Congress did not enact 
the statute for the purpose of benefitting physicians but rather to encourage 
peer review against physicians.87  This means that even if a hospital did not 
provide adequate notice and a hearing, a physician may not sue a hospital 
on that basis. 
There is a possible cause of action for physicians that are reviewed 
by public hospitals, as their actions would potentially be governed by 
constitutional due process protections.  State actors are not permitted to 
infringe on certain protected interests without providing proper due process 
of law.88  However, public hospitals comprise less than twenty-five percent 
of all hospitals in the United States, so it is much less common for issues to 
arise from the peer review process.89  Moreover, private health care entities 
do not have a parallel restriction unless one can be mined from the language 
or purposes of HCQIA.  Any statutory protection for due process, however, 
                                                 
 85. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 86. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“HCQIA does not explicitly or implicitly afford 
aggrieved physicians a cause of action when a hospital fails to follow the HCQIA’s 
prescribed peer review procedures.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“Concluding that the HCQIA 
does not provide for a private cause of action . . . .”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“However, 
the HCQIA does not expressly create a cause of action in favor of a physician against a 
professional peer review group that has violated its due process requirements.” (citing and 
accepting the trial court’s opinion)). 
 87. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“The HCQIA’s grant of immunity to review boards 
strongly suggests that the Act was not enacted to benefit the physician undergoing peer 
review.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“We agree . . . that Congress did not pass the HCQIA with 
the intent of benefiting physicians . . . .”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“ . . . HCQIA was not 
enacted to benefit physicians subject to peer review . . . .”). These courts have also agreed 
that an overall weighing of the Cort factors also does not favor finding an implied cause of 
action. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“We conclude that none of these relevant factors weights 
in favor of an implied cause of action.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“More importantly, a 
weighing of the Cort factors also argues against finding an implied cause of action in the 
HCQIA.”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“A weighing of the factors outlined in Cort v. Ash 
leads the court to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action for the 
benefit of physicians to enforce provisions of the HCQIA.” (citing and accepting the trial 
court’s opinion)). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 89. TARESSA FRAZE ET AL., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
STATISTICAL BRIEF #95: PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 2008 (2010), available at 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb95.pdf. 
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would still not provide an independent cause of action for this type of 
violation. 
If an argument about the adequacy of procedures is raised to a 
court, it is raised only to mitigate the immunity that a hospital is already 
using as a shield.  Therefore, a physician would sue for an independent 
claim such as defamation or antitrust and the hospital would assert HCQIA 
immunity against such a claim.90  In order to overcome this immunity 
defense, a physician would then raise the issue about adequacy of 
proceedings to defeat that immunity.  Inadequate procedures are never 
enough under HCQIA to initiate the physician’s claim—no matter how 
severe the violation. 
Courts have tried to soften this analysis with the understanding that 
HCQIA only provides immunity for monetary damages and does not 
prevent declaratory or injunctive relief.91  For example, the Fifth Circuit in 
Polinar v. Texas Health Systems explained: 
It bears emphasizing that . . . hospitals and peer review 
committees that comply with the HCQIA’s requirements 
are [not] free to violate the applicable bylaws and state law.  
The HCQIA does not gainsay the potential for abuse of the 
peer review process.  To the contrary, Congress limited the 
reach of immunity to money damages.  The doors to the 
courts remain open to doctors who are subjected to 
unjustified or malicious peer review, and they may seek 
appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief in response to 
such treatment.  The immunity from money damages may 
work harsh outcomes in certain circumstances, but that 
results from Congress’ decision that the system-wide 
benefit of robust peer review in rooting out incompetent 
physicians, protecting patients, and preventing malpractice 
outweighs those occasional harsh results; that giving 
physicians access to the courts to assure procedural 
protections while denying a remedy of money damages 
strikes the balance of remedies essential to Congress’ 
objective of vigorous peer review.  The doctor may not 
recover money damages, but can access the court for other 
relief preventive of an abusive peer review.92 
However, none of the cases before courts of appeals argued or raised the 
issue of declaratory or injunctive relief.  This is partially because HCQIA 
                                                 
 90. It is true that HCQIA only immunizes for monetary damages, and injunctive or 
declaratory relief is still available. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (2013). 
 91. See, e.g., Polinar v. Tex. Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 381 (5th Cir. 2008); Freilich 
v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 92. Polinar, 537 F.3d at 381. 
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does not provide a cause of action to remedy lack of procedure but only 
provides immunity.  It may also be that monetary damages are the desired 
remedy to deter problematic peer review.  The converse of this is also 
unfortunately true, if a hospital violates its bylaws or state laws in providing 
procedure to a physician, HCQIA offers no protection.  As the Fourth 
Circuit notes, “[n]othing in HCQIA makes immunity depend on adherence 
to bylaws.”93 
There are also times where a physician will either intentionally or 
unintentionally waive his or her ability to raise a procedural claim.94  For 
example, in the Fourth Circuit a plaintiff physician waived his right to 
object before the court because he did not object to the composition of a 
hearing panel at the time it was convened.95  To be fair, the statute does 
explicitly state in § 11112(b) that the requirements of subsection (a)(3) will 
be met if they are “waived voluntarily by the physician.”96  However, if the 
requirements under the safe harbor provision are not requirements at all but 
mere guidelines, how confident can a court be that a physician has properly 
waived them or even understands what pieces of process are necessary to 
induce fairness at the time of the hearing?  Without a rubric or a firm list of 
requirements, waiver seems at best to be illusory. 
Even when claims about proper procedural process are raised, the 
larger claim about HCQIA immunity is usually settled at the summary 
judgment stage.  Courts have broadly viewed the presence of immunity as a 
“question of law for the court to decide . . . [that] may be resolved 
whenever the record in a particular case becomes sufficiently developed.”97  
The Eleventh Circuit pointed out in Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional 
Medical Center that the House Committee intended for the provisions of 
HCQIA to allow defendants to resolve the issue of immunity in as 
expeditious a manner as possible and intended for a court to determine 
immunity even though other issues remained to be resolved.98  The court 
noted, “[t]he substantive standards under HCQIA remain the same 
regardless of the point at which the immunity determination occurs.”99  The 
court then compared HCQIA immunity with immunity under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and held that qualified immunity in either case should not become a 
part of the jury instructions once the defense has been denied on a motion 
for summary judgment.100  While not making this same direct comparison, 
                                                 
 93. Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 Fed.Appx. 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 94. See e.g., Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 176 (4th Cir. 2009); 
Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Health Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2003); Sugarbaker v. 
SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 1999); Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 95. Moore, 560 F.3d at 176. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b) (2013). 
 97. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1332. 
 98. Id. at 1332 and n.24. 
 99. Id. at 1332. 
 100. Id. at 1332–33. 
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other courts have similarly concluded that the issue of immunity is a legal 
question.101 
Contrariwise, the First Circuit in Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, Inc., would draw a line between immunity under HCQIA 
with immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “[q]ualified immunity 
determinations under § 1983 are ‘question[s] of law, subject to resolution 
by the judge and not the jury,’ while HCQIA immunity determinations may 
be resolved by a jury if they cannot be resolved at the summary judgment 
stage.”102  Making this division would make HCQIA immunity, especially 
questions involving adequate process, a fact-based question that could be 
answered by either a judge or a jury as opposed to a pure legal question.  
The court found this distinction appropriate because qualified immunity 
analysis for § 1983 involves a “quintessential legal question: whether the 
rights at issue are clearly established.”103  HCQIA immunity does not 
involve such a clear legal question, although the court did concede that 
“determinations under the HCQIA may often become legal determinations 
appropriate for resolution by the judge at summary judgment.”104  A further 
distinction was drawn between the two types of immunity because qualified 
immunity under § 1983 is an immunity from suit that is effectively lost if a 
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial while HCQIA is a mere defense 
to liability for monetary damages only.105  If a suit is improperly allowed to 
continue when § 1983 immunity is present, the harm is partially in merely 
allowing the suit to continue.  However, under HCQIA, if money damages 
are not awarded, litigating over whether they should be does not violate the 
immunity in and of itself.106 
The First Circuit further argues that there is no reason to insulate 
the determination of proper peer review actions from jurors, because while 
peer review actions may not be “within the common experience of jurors, 
they are not so esoteric that they cannot be fairly evaluated by jurors, 
perhaps with the assistance of expert witnesses.”107  If jurors are asked to 
conclude about the quality of medical care in medical malpractice cases, 
there is no reason to exclude them from decisions about immunity 
determinations under the statute.108 
                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Doe v. La. Psychiatric Med. Ass’n, No. 96-30232, 1996 WL 670414, at 
*2 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1996) (“[T]he issue of immunity is a legal question for the court to 
decide.”); Parsons v. Sanchez, No. 93-55656, 1995 WL 21695, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1995) 
(“Congress intended for the court to address the immunity issue well before trial.”). 
 102. 308 F.3d 25, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 
 103. Id. at 35. 
 104. Id. at 36. 
 105. Id. at 35. 
 106. Id. See also Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that HCQIA immunity is “immunity from liability only,” not an immunity from 
suit). 
 107. Singh, 308 F.3d at 35. 
 108. Id. 
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While some courts debate about whether the issue of immunity 
should ever be given to a jury, other courts avoid the issue by simply 
resolving immunity determinations under HCQIA at the summary judgment 
stage.  However, summary judgment determinations about immunity in this 
context are described by most courts to be “unusual” because of a 
presumption provision contained in the statute.109  The statute states, after 
laying out the requirements necessary for a health care entity to receive 
immunity, that “[a] professional review action shall be presumed to have 
met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in section 
11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”110  This presumption language creates a standard for 
summary judgment that asks, irrespective of the party moving for summary 
judgment, “[m]ight a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for 
[the plaintiff physician] conclude that [he/she] has shown, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the [defendant hospital’s or defendant 
physicians’] actions are outside the scope of § 11112(a)?”111  This means 
that “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process 
was not reasonable.”112  Courts have understood this statutory language to 
“place[] a high burden on physicians to demonstrate that a professional 
review action should not be afforded immunity.”113  A lack of a cause of 
action contained in HCQIA combined with inappropriate waiver and a 
presumption that health care entities should receive immunity explains why 
this issue rarely presents itself before federal courts, and why so few 
physicians have been able to overcome these obstacles. 
B. Analysis of Statutory Due Process before Circuit Courts 
Circuit courts attempted to interpret or apply HCQIA seventy-two 
times since the statute was enacted, but only dealt with the issue of whether 
adequate notice and hearing was provided twenty-six times.114  Of those 
twenty-six cases, four were summary affirmations—the courts indicated 
that the physician had not provided by a preponderance of the evidence that 
                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Moore v. John Deere Health Care Plan, Inc., 492 F. App’x 632, 636 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(calling it an “unconventional standard”); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 202 
(3d Cir. 2005); Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The 
statutory presumption . . . adds a rather unconventional twist to the burden of proof in our 
summary judgment standard of review.”); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 
F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003); Singh, 308 F.3d at 33–34; Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1994); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733–34 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 111. Austin, 979 F.2d at 733–34. 
 112. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1333. 
 113. See, e.g., Gordon, 423 F.3d at 202. 
 114. Chart, supra note 81. 
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the process was inadequate with absolutely no explanation or reasoning.115  
Only twice did the physician prevail in while claiming an issue of 
inadequate hearing or notice (and only three times total out of seventy-two 
cases did the physician prevail in any capacity) and the courts found in 
those cases that the district courts simply did not consider the issue of 
HCQIA or whether the presumption was overcome and instructed them to 
do so.116  However, in both of those cases, the physician was ultimately 
denied any relief from HCQIA immunity.117 
Initially, it is important to note, that the courts, like Congress, 
believe strongly that § 11112(a)(3) provides a due process component.118  
                                                 
 115. Three of these summary affirmations occurred in the Fifth Circuit and one in the 
Third Circuit. Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 85 F. App’x 308 (3d Cir. 2004); Van 
v. Anderson, 66 F. App’x 524 (5th Cir. 2003); Payne v. Harris Methodist HEB, 44 F. App’x 
652 (5th Cir. 2002); Pickett v. HCA Hosp. Corp., 199 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 116. Bundren v. Parriott, 245 F. App’x 822, 826 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Dr. 
Bundren . . . attacked the fairness of the . . . proceeding . . . . Given these attacks on 
the . . . proceeding, the district court should have determined whether Dr. Bundren had 
overcome the presumption that the § 11112(a) factors were met. It did not do so.”); Brader v. 
Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If Brader’s allegations, such as the 
alleged failure to provide Brader with fair hearing procedures, are true, the defendants would 
not be entitled to HCQIA immunity  We therefore decline to affirm the district court’s 
dismissal of Brader’s claims on the alternative grounds of HCQIA immunity.”).  The third 
case of a doctor prevailing under HCQIA was Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, 
but it did not have to do with adequate notice and hearing. 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“At trial, Dr. Brown presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the peer review action was not taken after a ‘reasonable 
effort to obtain the facts of the matter.’”). 
 117. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment against the physician on the 
merits of his original claims without regard to the claims of HCQIA immunity. Bundren, 245 
F. App’x at 826–27.  The Third Circuit later found that the hospital had met the requirements 
under HCQIA for immunity. Brader, 167 F.3d at 832. 
 118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spohn, 334 F. App’x 673, 682 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ppellees 
were required to grant Dr. Johnson due process protections at some point prior to the final 
revocation of his medical staff membership and clinical privileges.”) (emphasis added); 
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2002) (“For HCQIA 
immunity to attach, however, the peer review action must comport with due process.”) 
(emphasis added); Sugarbaker v. SSM Healthcare, 190 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The 
failure to provide a physician with adequate notice and fair procedures precludes immunity 
under the HCQIA. Dr. Sugarbaker asserts that evidence . . . rebut[s] the presumption that St. 
Mary’s provided adequate notice and due process in this case.”) (emphasis added); Mathews 
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The standards that a professional 
review action must satisfy in order to entitle participants in the review process to 
immunity . . . include certain fairness and due process requirements.”) (emphasis added); 
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(“Accordingly, HCQIA provides that, if a ‘professional review action’ (as defined in the 
statute) meets certain due process and fairness requirements, then those participating in such 
a review process shall not be liable . . . .”) (emphasis added); Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield of Kan., Inc., 21 F.3d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The HCQIA’s granting of 
professional peer review immunity, however, is conditioned by two factors. First, a 
professional peer review group must provide adequate due process protection to the 
physician subjected to review.”) (emphasis added); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“HCQIA provides that if a ‘professional review action’ (as defined in 
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The immunity contained in the statute is conditioned partially upon a 
provision of “adequate due process protection to the physician subjected to 
the review.”119  However, the real problem is that courts have no way to 
analyze whether due process protections in any given situation are 
“adequate” besides holding them up to the safe harbor provisions of the 
statute, or in some cases a hospital’s bylaws.  Even when a hospital violates 
its own bylaws or does not provide what is required under § 11112(b), a 
court will point out that the statute does not require full compliance with 
those listed procedures.120  There is no rubric for adequacy given in the 
statute and courts have uniformly declined to adopt one.  For example, the 
Tenth Circuit in Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kansas notes that a 
professional peer review group must provide adequate due process 
protection, but further states, “HCQIA details a number of procedures 
which Congress deemed to be adequate due process, and creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the professional peer review group met the due 
process requirements even if it did not follow the HCQIA’s procedures.”121  
Therefore there is no way inside the language of the statute for a court to 
tell whether a health care entity has provided adequate notice and hearing 
procedures but merely a requirement that these things exist.  This line of 
thinking renders the safe harbor provisions in § 11112(b) virtually 
meaningless and does not help to provide physicians with any procedural 
protection. 
Courts have sometimes at least recognized that, at base, the due 
process requirements in HCQIA must imply there is some kind of notice to 
the physician and an opportunity for him or her to be heard (just like the 
base requirement of constitutional due process).122  However, some courts 
seem to be confusing the safe harbor provisions that can satisfy the 
adequacy requirement as the only list against which violations may be 
                                                                                                                 
HCQIA) meets certain due process and fairness requirements, then those participating in the 
review ‘shall not be liable in damages . . . .’”) (emphasis added). 
 119. Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374. 
 120. See, e.g., Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F. App’x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although Dr. Wieters has pointed out parts of the process that did not hew strictly to the 
bylaws and the safe harbor provisions, he has presented nothing that would lead a reasonable 
jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the hospital treated him unfairly under 
the circumstances.”); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Health Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 469–70 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (“[Doctor] argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that LMH did not provide 
adequate notice and procedures because it did not comply with its own bylaws. . . . [E]ven 
assuming LMH did violate the bylaws, the notice and procedures provided complied with 
the HCQIA’s statutory ‘safe harbor’ . . . .”). 
 121. Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (emphasis added). 
 122. See, e.g., Soriano v. Neshoba Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 486 F. App’x 444, 446 
(5th Cir. 2012) (“His procedural due process rights were not violated. . . . ‘The essential 
requirements of procedural due process under the Constitution are notice and an opportunity 
to respond.’”) (citation omitted); Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (“We also reject Dr. Lee’s argument that the hospital did not afford her ‘adequate 
notice and hearing procedures,’ as required by § 11112(a)(3) . . . . Dr. Lee had ample notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.”). 
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measured.  In other words, these courts have held that if a piece of process 
is not listed in the statute it is never required in order to have an adequate 
process.  For example, the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. Ricks involved a 
challenge from Dr. Smith concerning his removal from Good Samaritan 
Hospital.123  The court concluded that the allegation of defects in the 
procedure was an attempt by Dr. Smith to convert “peer review proceedings 
to look like regular trials in a court of law.”124  However, “nothing in the 
statute requires such formalities.”125  This was held to be true even though 
“[t]he statute expressly provides that hospitals need not meet all of the 
§ 11112(b) requirements. The ultimate inquiry is whether the notice and 
hearing procedures were adequate.”126  The court never identifies which 
formalities suffice for adequacy and which are those that the statute does 
not require. Ultimately the court does conclude that either the procedures 
undertaken by the hospital satisfy § 11112(b) safe harbor provisions or they 
are “so close to the ‘safe harbor’ that no reasonable jury could find Dr. 
Smith rebutted the presumption that the procedures were adequate.”127  No 
indication was given by the court as to how wide the margin of error was 
for procedures to be “so close” to the safe harbor provisions as to still be 
adequate. 
Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit case of Freilich v. Upper 
Chesapeake Health, Inc., the court concluded that Dr. Freilich’s seventeen 
alleged procedural defects, including permitting hearsay and denying 
hospital privileges when no incompetence had been found, were insufficient 
to deny HCQIA immunity.128  Her allegations were interpreted by the court 
that “she would like this court to rewrite the HCQIA. . . . [W]e cannot 
substitute our judgment, or that of Dr. Freilich, for Congress’s rationally 
based belief that the HCQIA is an effective means to achieve its goal.”129  
Merely alleging that certain procedures were necessary to be “fair under her 
circumstances” was tantamount to the court to a claim to rewrite the statute 
to mandate them in all cases. 
The First Circuit has also held that “the HCQIA procedural 
standard does not require . . . such a procedural safeguard [as claimed by 
the plaintiff]. Nothing in the Act requires that a physician be permitted to 
participate in the review of his care.”130  Apparently, the fear is that in 
imposing any additional requirements or of merely requiring some of the 
requirements in the safe harbor provision would “force every informal 
review activity of a doctor or a department into time-consuming and 
                                                 
 123. 31 F.3d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 124. Id. at 1487. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1486. (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 1487. 
 128. 313 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Singh v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(depending on the outcome of the informal review) possibly unnecessary 
formalized proceedings.”131 
In some extreme cases, procedures that are “fair to the physician 
under the circumstances” might even result in a complete lack of a hearing. 
The Fourth Circuit in Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. 
concluded that not providing a hearing did not necessarily violate HCQIA’s 
statutory requirements.132  The court interpreted the statute to provide 
immunity in two capacities under § 11112(a)(3) because “[s]tated in the 
disjunctive, the statute contemplates two independent avenues by which the 
subsection (a) immunity prong may be obtained.”133  Either immunity can 
be achieved by providing “adequate notice and hearing procedures” or it 
may be obtained by using “other procedures as are fair to the physician 
under the circumstances.”134  It is completely unclear why inadequate notice 
and hearing procedures would ever be fair unless relying on the emergency 
valve of § 11112(c) that is already provided.  Even though the legislative 
history notes a concerted effort to protect the doctor in the process of peer 
review,135 the Fourth Circuit contends, “[n]othing in this legislative history 
alters the conclusion that a health care entity can satisfy subsection (a)(3) 
without providing a formal hearing, as contemplated in the safe harbor 
provisions, depending on the circumstances of a particular case.”136  In 
other words, sometimes it is fair to the physician under the circumstances to 
provide no hearing at all. 
There is no more of a rubric for “fairness” then there is for 
“adequacy of proceedings,” should proceedings occur at all.  Another 
example of a hospital offering no hearing whatsoever is in the Ninth Circuit 
case of Fox v. Good Samaritan Hospital, where: 
[a]lthough Good Samaritan did not offer Fox a formal 
administrative hearing, such a hearing was not necessary 
under the unique circumstances of Fox’s case . . . . A 
formal hearing geared toward resolving factual disputes 
would therefore have done nothing to help Fox’s case or 
aid Good Samaritan’s decision-making.137 
Factual disputes are also necessary to lodge a constitutional procedural due 
process claim,138 however, as physicians are unable to challenge the abuse 
                                                 
 131. See Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 842 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 132. 562 F.3d 599, 606 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 133. Id. at 608. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 52. 
 136. Wahi, 562 F.3d at 609. 
 137. 467 F. App’x 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 138. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977)(“But if the hearing mandated by the 
Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual dispute 
between an employer and a discharged employee which has some significant bearing on the 
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of a lack of hearing directly and may inadvertently waive their right to a 
hearing, a complete lack of procedure seems inapposite to the purpose of 
the statute.  Furthermore, without notice or an opportunity to respond, it 
may be impossible in some cases to determine whether there is indeed a 
factual dispute. 
Even with some resistance on the part of some circuit courts to 
offer the overall question of HCQIA immunity to a jury,139 other courts 
have concluded that summary judgment is appropriate because a reasonable 
jury could find that the treatment of the physician was fair under the 
circumstances.140  This type of conclusion begins with the premise that the 
adequacy of process may be measured with an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
There has been some debate in the circuit courts over the use of the 
word “reasonable” in the other three standards that confer HCQIA 
immunity:141 “a professional review action must be taken . . . in the 
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health 
care . . . after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter . . . in the 
reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known.”142  
The Ninth Circuit contended that “the legislative history of HCQIA reveals 
that Congress rejected a subjective standard in favor of an 
objective . . . standard,” therefore, “the propriety of professional review 
actions only concern[] issues of objective reasonableness.”143  This makes 
any claims of bad faith on the part of the reviewing panel irrelevant to the 
concern of whether it should receive immunity.144  The Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
employee’s reputation.”). However, adequate notice and an opportunity to refute the charges 
should there be some sort of factual dispute is still required. 
 139. See, e.g., Parsons v. Sanchez, No. 93-55656, 1995 WL 21695, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 
19, 1995) (“Parsons contends that the immunity defense raises issues of subjective intent that 
cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage.  We reject this argument, because the 
propriety of professional review actions only concerns issues of objective reasonableness.”); 
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 140. Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 633 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Bryan, 
33 F.3d at 1333) (“We must examine the record in this case to determine whether [Dr. 
Mathews] satisfied his burden of producing evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the Hospital’s peer review disciplinary process failed to meet the standards of 
the [Act].”). 
 141. See, e.g., Parsons, 1995 WL 21695; Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 143. Parsons, 1995 WL 21695, at *4. This is partially borne out in the language of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce Report. (“Initially, the Committee considered a ‘good 
faith’ standard for professional review actions.  In response to concerns that ‘good faith’ 
might be misinterpreted as requiring only a test of the subjective state of mind of the 
physicians conducting the professional review action, the Committee changed to a more 
objective ‘reasonable belief’ standard.  The Committee intends that this test will be satisfied 
if reviewers, with the information available to them at the time of the professional review 
action, would reasonably have concluded that their action would restrict incompetent 
behavior or would protect patients.”) H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6392. 
 144. Parsons, 1995 WL 21695, at *4–5. 
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found immunity when a physician was terminated due to his hostile 
behavior towards his fellow staff members.145  The hospital was found to 
have acted in the reasonable belief that its actions were to protect patients 
even though the physician claimed the action was a personal vendetta by 
the board members.146  The court claimed that: 
assertions of hostility do not support [the doctor’s] position 
[that the Hospital is not entitled to the HCQIA’s 
protections] because they are irrelevant to the 
reasonableness standards of § 11112(a).  The test is an 
objective one, so bad faith is immaterial.  The real issue is 
the sufficiency of the basis for the [Hospital’s] actions.147 
This kind of judicial interpretation ignores any motivation on the part of the 
peer review committee or health care entity to abuse the peer review 
process for reasons incompatible with patient care.  Essentially the courts 
are abdicating the oversight role given to them by the statute when 
insulating their “reasonableness” analysis from clear subjective malice in 
initiating the process of peer review or the conduction of procedures as a 
whole.  It also removes consideration of whether or not the decisionmaker 
was neutral, which is a key consideration in constitutional procedural due 
process claims.148 
Courts also tend to read all of the requirements for immunity 
together, imputing this objective reasonableness standard into the adequacy 
component as well.149  This leads to minimal analysis about the adequacy of 
                                                 
 145. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 148. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (“Clearly, if the initial view of the facts 
based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter 
foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to 
ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Moore v. John Deere Health Care Plan, Inc., 492 F. App’x 632, 638 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“A professional review action is presumed to satisfy HCQIA’s four-factor 
reasonableness test for immunity unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”); 
Cohlmia v. St. John Med. Ctr., 693 F.3d 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The entity or persons 
that undertake the professional review are immune under HCQIA as long as they 
substantially comply with a list of objective standards set forth in the Act.”); Wahi v. 
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009) (“In determining whether a 
health care entity has met these four [immunity] requirements, the Court applies an objective 
test . . . .”); Poliner v. Texas Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with 
our sister circuits that the HCQIA’s reasonableness requirements were intended to create an 
objective standard of performance . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Singh v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Adopting objective 
reasonable belief standards, the HCQIA advances the Congressional purpose of permitting a 
determination of immunity without extensive inquiry into the state of mind of peer 
reviewers. . . . Our sister circuits have uniformly applied all the sections of § 11112(a) as 
objective standards.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 
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any given proceeding and can even allow the immunity requirements to 
blend into one sliding scale of “reasonableness” rather than four 
independent, necessary requirements.  Several circuits have relied on 
whether the court believes in the abstract that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the process was unfair.150 
The Fourth Circuit has further imported this objectivity into an 
analytical framework that looks to the totality of the circumstances for 
whether HCQIA immunity is appropriate.151  Even when a hospital failed to 
follow its own bylaws and procedures manual or provide the doctor with a 
list of witnesses who would testify against him, the court said, “[T]hese 
failures by [Charleston Area Medical Center], when viewed in the totality 
of the circumstances against a measuring stick of objective 
reasonableness, do not show [Dr.] Wahi met his burden of proof to rebut 
the presumption of immunity under the HCQIA.”152  According to the 
court, if a physician can allege procedural deficiencies on behalf of the 
hospital or reviewing panel, it is determined from a jury’s perspective 
whether that renders the process unfair or objectively unreasonable.153 
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit again used this rubric in the case of Dr. 
Muniz, saying “[w]e do not believe that a reasonable jury could find that 
the procedural irregularities involving the hearing officer—unwise though 
some of them were—rendered Muniz’s peer review process unfair or 
objectively unreasonable.”154  Rather than determine what procedures 
would be appropriate to satisfy the statutory requirement, the court 
concluded, “[a] reasonable jury could only conclude that it was ‘fair’ for the 
Board to terminate Muniz after giving her extensive opportunity in a 
lengthy hearing to explain her misrepresentations.”155  This kind of analysis 
completely ignores the list of safe harbor provisions Congress provided in 
§ 11112(b) as an example of a proceeding that would be adequate in favor 
of the most informal procedure possible.  It reduces the floor to mere notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, with no real measuring calculus for either 
component. 
                                                                                                                 
1485 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because the ‘reasonableness’ requirements of § 11112(a) were 
intended to create an objective standard . . . .”). 
 150. See, e.g., Moore, 492 F. App’x at 641 (“The district court found that a reasonable 
jury could not find by a preponderance of evidence that the peer review action in this case 
was taken in the absence of adequate notice and hearing procedures . . . . [T]he district court 
correctly found that Moore failed to meet his burden . . . .”); Smith, 31 F.3d at 1487 (“Good 
Samaritan’s procedures either fit into the § 11112(b)(3) ‘safe harbor,’ or are so close to the 
‘safe harbor’ that no reasonable jury could find Dr. Smith rebutted the presumption that the 
procedures were adequate.”). 
 151. Wahi, 562 F.3d at 606. 
 152. Id. at 614. 
 153. Id. at 607. 
 154. Hein-Muniz v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., 532 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 155. Id. at 345. 
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III. IMPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS TO THE 
HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
A. Constitutional Due Process 
When making a constitutional procedural due process claim, it is 
necessary that the individual be subject to government action in an 
individualized hearing that infringes on a protected interest.156  Once due 
process has been triggered, a court must determine what process is due in 
any given situation.157  There is no set standard of what procedures due 
process may provide for in any particular adjudication, although case law 
has created a continuum for the kinds of process that may be required.158 
At the floor, due process requires merely that an individual be 
given notice and an opportunity to be heard.159  At the ceiling, due process 
can demand much or all of the process of a full trial.160 The Court in 
Goldberg required significant procedure, including: 
[T]imely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the 
proposed termination; an effective opportunity to defend by 
confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by 
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally, 
although informal procedures would suffice; the right to be 
represented by counsel, although not the right to have 
counsel provided; a decision that rests solely on the 
evidence adduced at the hearing; an impartial 
decisionmaker; and a statement by the decisionmaker 
explaining his decision and the evidence relied upon, 
although the statement need not be a “full opinion” or 
contain “formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.”161 
While requiring an exhaustive list of procedures, the Court in Goldberg 
noted that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities 
                                                 
 156. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.1 (2014). 
 157. Id. § 17.8(i). 
 158. Id. § 17.9(c)(i). 
 159. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that a student in a public high 
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requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of 
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 160. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970). 
 161. WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMIN. PROCEDURE 
AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 259 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing requirements of 
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and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”162  Once this continuum 
has been established, due process might require any number of procedures 
ranging from informal to formal, and the critical question becomes, how 
does a court tell what measure of process is constitutionally required in a 
given case? 
From an administrative law perspective, which seems appropriate 
given the involvement of Health and Human Services under HCQIA, most 
agencies have a choice of procedures when performing adjudications like a 
peer review. Formal adjudications are only required when invoked under 
§§ 554, 556, and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.163  Section 554 
of the Administrative Procedure Act says that it will apply and trigger a 
formal hearing “in every case of adjudication required by statute to be 
determined on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing.”164  
While not the full protection of a trial, a “formal agency hearing” still has 
strict requirements about notice, burden of proof, ex parte communications, 
testimony and cross-examination, and the record established.165  Agencies 
also frequently conduct informal hearings and while those proceedings are 
unregulated directly by the Administrative Procedure Act,166 they are still 
subject to the procedural due process protections of the federal 
constitution.167 Informal hearings occur frequently and can invoke a variety 
of potential processes to satisfy constitutional requirements.168 
As the Supreme Court noted in Goss, while reifying a minimum of 
procedures, “the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause 
[is an] intensely practical matter[] and that ‘[t]he very nature of due process 
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 
imaginable situation.’”169  How does an agency, or a hospital peer review 
                                                 
 162. 397 U.S. at 268–69. 
 163. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2014). 
 164. Id. § 554. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Although these adjudications are still subject to the ancillary requirements of 
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committee, determine where along the due process continuum is 
appropriate in any given case?  For constitutional due process, courts 
almost uniformly use the rubric from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine 
how much process is due.170 
At issue in Mathews was whether Mr. Eldridge was entitled, under 
the due process clause, to receive an evidentiary hearing before the 
termination of his Social Security disability benefits.171  The Social Security 
Act provided cash benefits to workers who were completely disabled.172  
Mr. Eldridge began receiving benefits in 1968 but after a series of letters 
the state agency made a final determination that his disability had ceased in 
May of 1972 and he would no longer receive benefits.173  This 
determination was accepted by the federal Social Security 
Administration.174  Eldridge sued, relying on the logic of Goldberg v. Kelly, 
that there was a due process right to an evidentiary hearing before 
termination of benefits.175 
After concluding that the due process clause did apply to his case, 
the Court noted that it had “consistently . . . held that some form of hearing 
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”176  
While, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” what process is 
due in any given circumstance “generally requires a consideration of three 
distinct factors.”177  These three factors include: first, the private interest 
that will be affected by the action; second, the government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would require; and 
third, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards.178 
As Eldridge’s benefits were not based on financial need as the 
welfare benefits were in Goldberg, the Court did not weigh his individual 
interest to be overly strong, and the weight on the administration for full 
evidentiary hearings was high.179  Moreover, disability benefits usually 
turned upon “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists” and “the potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral 
presentation to the decisionmaker is substantially less in this context than in 
                                                 
 170. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 156, at § 17.8(i). 
 171. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). 
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 173. Id. at 323–24. 
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Goldberg.”180  Therefore, when weighing out the factors, Mr. Eldridge was 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of constitutional, 
procedural due process protections.181  However, the formula remains.  The 
way the factors are structured, particularly the third factor concerning the 
value of a piece of process, requires the aggrieved party to identify a piece 
of process that was missing in the underlying proceeding and argue for the 
merits of its inclusion. 
B. The Appropriateness of Using Mathews v. Eldridge to Analyze 
Statutory Due Process Required by the Healthcare Quality 
Improvement Act 
If a hospital is public and thus a state actor, then taking away a 
doctor’s liberty interest in pursuing his or her profession or a property right 
in his or her employment via an individualized decision making may trigger 
the due process protections of the federal constitution.182  However, relying 
on the use of “adequate notice and hearing” and even “fair under the 
circumstances” combined with a robust legislative history and court 
analysis, it is clear that HCQIA is trying to import a due process standard 
into the peer review process.  For analysis of procedural due process, the 
statutory framework means that there is no need to consider whether or not 
due process has been “triggered” as is done in a constitutional analysis of 
what interests are being protected and who is acting and how they are 
acting.  Rather, in recognition of Congress’ intention for doctors to have 
due process protections under the statute, the analysis may start with what 
process is due.  Once that obstacle is overcome, there is no reason to suffer 
the application of § 11112(a)(3) without a rubric as to adequacy, as due 
                                                 
 180. Id. at 344–45 (citations omitted). 
 181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. 
 182. See, e.g., Schueller v. Goddard, 631 F.3d 460, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A 
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therefore, established that he has a constitutionally-protected property right in his medical 
privileges.”). 
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process jurisprudence has already provided one in the form of Mathews v. 
Eldridge.183 
Without this kind of procedural protection, it is as if, “[p]rivate 
hospitals, now largely supported by public moneys, [are not] required to 
govern their staff by accepted 20th Century democratic standards.  
Therefore, physicians . . . sacrifice[] their constitutional, civil, due process, 
14th Amendment, and natural rights under peer review in private 
hospitals.”184  Judicial interpretation of the statutory standard requiring 
adequate notice and hearing procedures has completely abandoned any 
desire to hold health care entities accountable to their bylaws, the safe 
harbor provisions, or any rubric for a proper hearing.  The peer review 
process may be leveraged for abuse or induced for competitive reasons that 
have nothing to do with the furtherance of quality patient care.  There is 
immunity for the process, but no oversight of the process itself. 
Part of the problem with the application of the peer review process 
is that it has been used to oust physicians for reasons other than 
incompetence in the workplace.  At times, the legal question has turned to 
whether the termination at issue was actually based on physician 
competence or rather based on other professional conduct or even private 
conduct that might impact the care of patients.  For example, the Third 
Circuit in Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital extended HCQIA immunity to 
conduct that did not have a direct impact on any patients but still took place 
in a professional capacity.185  Gordon, the physician, questioned whether 
the acts triggering the professional review action under HCQIA truly 
adversely affected patients.186  Dr. Gordon was employing what he believed 
to be a better surgical technique than another physician at the hospital.187 
He ran ads in the newspaper advising potential patients to call the hospital 
to get more information about the two procedures and eventually went so 
far as to call the other physician’s patients to tell them disparaging 
information about the other physician.188  The hospital initially only 
suspended Dr. Gordon for forty-five days and conditioned his return on not 
communicating with patients or others about the skills, competence, or 
procedures of other physicians at the hospital.189  Dr. Gordon breached 
these obligations by placing a phone call to at least one patient and mailing 
                                                 
 183. This would also stem resistance to the usage of procedural due process 
jurisprudence as a benchmark in cases that fall under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and HCQIA. 
See, e.g., Osuagwu, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (The hospital argued before the court that 
“because HCQIA immunity standards ‘are different’ from those establishing violation of 
procedural due process rights, the Court’s . . . due process analysis ‘is not determinative.’”). 
 184. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 138 (statement of Dr. W. Michael Bird). 
 185. 423 F.3d 184, 206 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 186. Id. at 202. 
 187. Id. at 193. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 194. 
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information to over thirty others about his technique, at which point the 
hospital revoked his privileges.190 
Dr. Gordon claimed that the hospital was not entitled to immunity 
under HCQIA because his acts did not affect adversely the health or welfare 
of patients as required for a professional review action.191  The Third 
Circuit disagreed and determined that even though the physician’s act did 
not directly threaten the health of the patients his acts harassed and 
intimidated patients.192  The court heavily relied on the language of the 
statute, more specifically “could” and “welfare.”193  The court determined 
that these terms allow for the inclusion of any conduct that might affect a 
patient’s well-being in any capacity.194  This is a common interpretation 
among the different circuits.195  Courts have determined that any narrower 
interpretation would be counter to the congressional intent behind 
HCQIA.196  As is common in agency interpretations of mandates, a court 
will refuse to substitute its own judgment with that of the hospital’s as to 
whether the actions could adversely affect a patient.197 
Pretext in the peer review process for outside conduct may extend 
to other areas as well.  When testifying before the Subcommittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, Dr. W. 
Michael Byrd contended: 
The hospital staff disciplinary process in this country is a 
national disgrace at the present time.  Physicians are 
maliciously being deprived of their rights to practice 
medicine based on race, economics, social class, ethnicity 
and even their political views.  This new climate of 
intolerance has permeated the peer review process to such 
an extent that often these proceedings have little to do with 
the quality of medicine offered the patient.198 
Additionally, before the House of Representatives, the lack of protection 
under the statute was specifically attacked, and Congressman Edwards 
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noted, “[u]nder the scheme established by this proposed legislation, 
competent doctors, with limited financial resources, whose rights have been 
violated by illegal peer review actions will be driven from medical practice 
with no hope of redress from existing Federal and State laws which provide 
protections from such illegal acts.”199  His argument was that there were 
simply not enough protections under the bill and that “the fundamental flaw 
of the bill in its present form continues to be that the immunities shield 
professional actions which are fair as well as actions which are illegal.”200 
There are some specific procedural protections that may be of use 
in particular circumstances to physicians.  With a Mathews v. Eldridge 
rubric a court could ask what is “fair under the circumstances” when the 
safe harbor provisions are not met, and determine whether another 
procedure is needed to ensure this fairness. As the legislative history points 
out: 
[the statute] does not mandate access to all medical records 
and documents that may be used by the peer review 
committee. Since a physician subject to peer review is, in a 
real sense, in jeopardy of losing his professional standing, 
it is essential that he have available all pertinent documents 
and other written evidence relevant to the proceedings in 
order to rebut the charges.201 
Of course, these requirements are all the more important when “a 
presumption of validity attaches to peer review actions, as the [statute] also 
provides.”202  Mathews provides for a weighing mechanism, a way to 
achieve the balance desired by Congress, between the resources and 
administrative and financial needs of the hospital or medical review panel 
and the individual interest of the physician at issue in the case. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis requires that a court evaluate each 
requested piece of process to see whether it is required in a given instance. 
This analysis does not mandate any particular kind of formal proceeding 
but looks, as the statute here requires, to see what is “adequate” or “fair 
under the circumstances.”203  When evaluating competing interests in a peer 
review proceeding, it is clear to see with a Mathews framework that a 
physician’s interest is strong.  Even without reverting to the constitutional 
analysis requirement of a liberty or property interest, a doctor has invested 
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an enormous amount of time and money into his or her education and 
career.204  With the reporting system in place, a bad outcome from a peer 
review proceeding could easily cost a physician his or her career in every 
state.  A hospital’s interest could also be strong in furthering patient care 
and protecting patients from incompetent or unprofessional doctors.  
However, in order to test whether or not the health care entity actually has 
such an interest in the proceeding and is not using the proceeding as a mere 
pretext would aid the analysis. If pretext is found, that would weigh against 
the hospital.  The cost, both of time and expense, of any additional 
procedures would also fall under this side of the interest analysis as a court 
seeks to balance the interests of the physician and the hospital. 
However, perhaps the most important part of the rubric is the 
investigation of whether a certain piece of process is required. For example, 
the safe harbor provisions provide that a physician may be represented in 
the hearing by an attorney or other person of the physician’s choice.205  
Rather than looking at that as a mandate or something to be ignored 
entirely, a court should inquire, given the competing interests in this case, 
does the addition of representation add something to the proceeding?  Does 
it reduce the possibility of error in a manner that is worth the cost of 
requiring the procedure in this instance?  This is a fact intensive case by 
case determination.  Certainly this asks more of a court than refusing to 
analyze the problem of procedure all together or sweeping it under a rug of 
opaque “reasonableness,” but it satisfies the will of Congress with regard to 
the statute.  Moreover, there is a body of jurisprudence in the area of 
constitutional procedural due process to apply Mathews v. Eldridge and to 
see when and why certain pieces of process are appropriate or required.206  
Currently the scale is not set to balance interests but is weighted 
presumptively, again and again and in a myriad of ways, in favor of the 
health care entity in ways that may not improve the quality of health care 
for patients.  This is an inexcusable interpretation of the statute given the 
accessibility of a procedural due process framework that does provide a 
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rubric for adequate notice and hearing procedures and a weighing 
mechanism for these important competing interests. 
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